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Summary findings
The  main problems  with  China's  pension  system-the  Other  scenarios  assume  that  the transition  cost  will be
heavy  pension  burdens  of state  enterprises  and the  aging  financed  by various  taxes  and that  a new,  fully funded
of the population-have  deepened  in recent  years.  individual  account  will be established  in 2001.  The
Using a new  computable  general  equilibrium  model  authors  compare  the impact  of a corporate  tax,  a value-
that  differentiates  between  three  types  of enterprise  added  tax,  a personal  income  tax,  and a consumptioin
ownership  and  22 groups  in the labor  force,  Wang,  Xu,  tax.  They  estimate  the  annual  transition  cost  to be about
Wang,  and  Zhai  estimate  the  effects of pension  reform  in  0.6  percent  of GDP between  2000  and  2010,  declining
China,  comparing  various  options  for  financing  the  to 0.3  percent  by 2050.  Using  a personal  income  tax to
transition  cost.  They  examine  the impact  that  various  finance  the  transition  cost  would  best promote  economic
reform  options  would  have on the  system's  sustainability,  growth  and  reduce  income  inequality.
on overall  economic  growth,  and on income  distribution.  Levying  a social security  tax and  injecting  fiscal
The  results  are promising.  resources  to finance  the transition  costs  would  help  make
The  current  pay-as-you-go  system,  with  a notional  the  reformed  public  pillar  sustainable.  To  finance  a
individual  account,  remains  unchanged  in the first  benefit  of 20 percent  of the average  wage,  a contribution
scenario  examined.  Simulations  show this  system to be  rate  of only  10 percent-12.5  percent  would  be enough  to
unsustainable.  Expanding  coverage  under  this system  balance  the  basic pension  pillar.  Gradually  increasing  the
would  improve  financial  viability  in the  short  run but  retirement  age would  further  reduce  the  contribution
weaken  it in the long run.  rate.
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A serious obstacle to China's  economic reform is the lack of an effective and sustainable  pension
system.  Two major problems with China's  current pension system, the short-run problem  of the
heavy pension burdens of State enterprises, and the longer-term problem arising from the rapid aging
of the population, have only deepened over the past few years.  Using a newly designed Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) model that differentiates among three types of enterprise ownership and
22 labor force groups, this study estimates the effects of China's pension reform and compares various
options for financing the implicit pension debt and transition cost.  The study examines the impacts
various reform options would have on the sustainability of the system, on overall economic growth,
and on income distribution.  Results from simulations of the various options are promising:
*  The baseline scenario.  Because China's population is growing at a decreasing rate, the labor force
will stop growing between 2015 and 2020 and will decline afterward, but the populations age 65
and  over will continue  to grow. Thus, the old  age dependency ratio will rise  steadily  from  11
percent in 1999 to 25 percent in 2030 and 36 percent in 2050. The system dependency ratio, which
is currently as high as 30 percent with three workers supporting one retiree, will rise rapidly to 69
percent in 2030 and 79 percent in 2050.  The pension system will be in deficit from 2000 onward,
and the implicit pension debt in 2000 will be as much as 71 percent of the average annual GDP.
*  Scenario set 1 assumes that the current system-  pay-as-you-go with a notional individual account-
remains unchanged.  Simulation results  confirm that this  system is not  sustainable.  Expanding
coverage under the current system will improve the financial situation in the short run, but it will
lead to a worsening of financial viability in the long run.
*  The second set of scenarios assumes that the transition cost will be financed by various taxes, and a
new fully funded individual account will be established as of 2001. Various options are considered:
a corporate tax, a value-added tax (VAT), a personal income tax, and a final demand tax, and the
impacts of these options  are compared.  The annual transition  cost is  estimated at around  0.6
percent of GDP between 2000 and 2010 and decline to 0.3 percent by 2050. Using personal income
tax  to  finance  the  transition  cost  would  best  promote  economic  growth  and  reduce  income
inequality.
*  Effects of the abovementioned reforms and levying a social security tax are shown in Scenario set
3. After injecting fiscal resources to finance the transition cost, the reformed public pillar becomes
financially sustainable. To finance a benefit of 20 percent of average wage, a contribution rate of
only 10 to 12.5 percent is sufficient to balance the basic pension pillar annually.  If the retirement
age of female workers is increased gradually by five years, the balanced contribution rate would be
reduced to around 9 percent.  In addition, if a new social security tax is levied to replace the current
pillar  1  contributions,  the  pension  system  would  become  nationally  unified  and  financially
sustainable.
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3Implicit Pension Debt, Transition Cost,
Options and Impact of China's Pension Reform
-A  Computable  General  Equilibrium  Analysis
China's  population  has  been aging rapidly,  and  the burdens  of  supporting  the  elderly  are
distributed unevenly across regions and sectors.  A serious obstacle to China's  economic reform is the
lack of an effective and sustainable national pension system.  The World Bank's  1997 report Old Age
Security: Pension Reform in China pointed to the two major problems with China's  current pension
system: the  short-run problem  of  the pension  burden  of  state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs),  and  the
longer-term problem  arising from  the rapid aging of the population.  Today these  problems have
become more severe than four years ago: for various  reasons including slowing economic growth,
many state enterprises have not been able to  afford to pay payroll taxes and thus, pension funds in
many municipalities are in deficit, which could threaten the fiscal stability of the central government as
well as the local governments.  '  Reforming the current pension system is now a matter of urgency.
Building on previous studies, this paper addresses the most urgent issue in China's  pension
reform,  namely,  how  to  finance  the  unfunded  pension  liabilities,  put  another  way,  this  study
investigates ways to recapitalize the pension system, which is financially nonviable. Previous studies
have  analyzed  the  problems  of  China's  urban-  and  enterprise-based  pay-as-you-go  system  and
recommended  a  multipillar  system combining  social pooling and  funded  individual accounts,  and
voluntary savings. 2 Some analyses including World Bank 1997 have used actuarial models to simulate
the impacts of various pension reform options, is a partial equilibrium framework, however, and has
some disadvantages as compared with a general equilibrium model.
Using  a  newly  designed Computable General Equilibrium  (CGE) model  that  differentiates
three  types  of enterprise  ownership and  22 labor force groups, this  study estimates the  effects of
China's  pension reform  and compares various  options for financing  the implicit pension  debt and
transition  cost. This  study examines the impacts various  reform design  options would have on the
sustainability of the system, on overall economic growth, and on income distribution.
Issues addressed by this paper have significant implications for China's fiscal stabilization and
public  sector reform and management, and  for the alleviation of poverty and  inequality. First,  the
unfunded pension liabilities represent a significant part of the direct and implicit (partly current and
partly future) liabilities of the local and central governments. 3 The deficit in social pooling funds in
1. Statistics  from the Ministry  of Labor and Social  Security  show that  Chinese  enterprises  owed  the government  as much as
RMB  38 billion (US$4.6  billion) in overdue  pension  contribution.  Separately,  it was reported  that in 1999,  the central
government  transferred  more  than RMB  17  billion to 25 provinces  for pension  payments (People's  Daily 1999).
2. On China's pension reform, see, for example, Ahmad and Hussain 1991; James 1997, and 1999; Hussain 1993; China
RGSSS 1995; Zhou 1994; Friedman, James, Kane, and Queisser 1996;Wang 1997; World Bank 1997, and recently Fox
2000, and Dorfman and Sin 2000.
3.  Government  liabilities  can  be  classified  into four  categories:  explicit  and  direct  (such  as  formal  debt,  budgeted
expenditure), explicit and contingent (e.g.,  government guarantees and deposit insurance schemes), implicit and current
(e.g., social insurance expenditure), and implicit and contingent (e.g., default of SOEs, banks, and social insurance funds).
See Brixi 1998.
4many localities has already become a threat to local government finance. If not monitored and checked
carefully, it could threaten the central government's  fiscal sustainability.  Second, pension  reform is
closely linked to restructuring  of the state sector and  financial sectors. It is desirable  to find  some
synergy between the transition problems  of the pension  system  and the state  sector, as  shown by
international experience. All  reform options involving taxation and  other fonns  of  financing  have
benefits and costs; this  study seeks to help making decision by comparing various reform  options.
Third, China's  income inequality has been rising, from a Gini coefficient of 28 percent in the 1  980s to
40 percent in  1998, a trend that should not be allowed to continue (World Bank  2000).4  It  is thus
crucial to examine the impact of pension reform on poverty and inequality.
A major contribution of this research is combining the CGE model  and population  growth
model into a recursive dynamic framework, which provides a new flexible tool to simulate various
pension  reform  plans  in  a  general  equilibrium  setting.  Another  contribution  is  differentiating
production and employment by ownership type and organizing the demographic data in a matrix with
four dimensions. Number of workers and worker income, two major variables of the pension  system,
have  been  organized  in  the  model  into  a  four-dimension matrix  based  on  sector,  age,  sex,  and
ownership of the enterprise. 5
Pension reform in China and around the world
Over the next 35 years, the proportion of the world's population that is over age 60 will nearly double
from 9 percent to 16 percent.  Because of rapid improvements in life expectancy and declining fertility
rates, populations are aging faster in developing countries than they did in industrial countries (World
Bank 1994b). In China the proportion of the population over age 60 will rise rapidly from 9 percent in
1990 to 22 percent in  2030 (World Bank  1997).  Based  on new base year data and our estimates,
China's old age dependency ratio (population 65+ /15-64 year-olds) will rise from 11 percent in  1999
to 25 percent in 2030 and 36 percent in 2050. Population aging has put  severe pressure on pension
systems around the world. Many countries have undertaken major or minor reforms of their pension
systems.  A review of the various approaches to pension reform puts China's reform into context and
provides rationales for our simulation design.
Box 1. Pension reform around the world
Three criteria can be used to classify pension systems around the world: how benefits are calculated
(defined  contribution  or defined  benefit) and whether  they are guaranteed  by the government;  how benefits are
financed,  funded or unfunded;  and whether  management  of the system  is public  or private. Most formal  pension
systems  are publicly  managed,  pay defined  benefits  according  to a fornula, and are financed  by payroll taxes on
a pay-as-you-go  basis, which implies  that contributions  made by today's workers  are used to pay the pensions  of
today's retirees.  It is now widely  recognized  that these systems  generate  many problems  such as rising payroll
tax rates, evasion and early retirement due to  incentive problems, misallocation of public resources, lost
4Gini  coefficients  estimated  by Chinese  researchers  seem  to be higher,  45 percent  in 1997,  or 51 percent  if the informal
economy  is included  (S. Wang  2000).
5. The  database  would  include,  for example,  the following  information:  the  total number  of female  workers  age 30-34
employed  in state-owned  enterprises  in the machinery  sector  is 356,722,  and  their  average  annual  salary  is RMB5122  per
year.
5opportunity to generate long-term savings, unintended intergeneration transfers (often to higher income groups
that  live  longer),  and  the  growth of a  large  implicit pension  debt  and  financing gap  in the  face  of aging
population. 6
To address the short-term and long-term fiscal viability problem as well as economic and distributive
concerns,  the World Bank (1994) has been  recommending and many countries (including China)  have been
moving toward, multipillar systems that contain the following provision:
*  A mandatory, tax-financed and publicly managed pillar for redistributive and coinsurance objectives;
*  A  mandatory,  fully funded,  defined  contribution  and privately-managed  pillar (individual  accounts)  for
savings;
*  A voluntary, fully funded pillar funded via personal savings or commercial insurance for people who would
like more protection for old age.
The multipillar pension system is defended by three main theoretical arguments that are supported by
limited empirical evidence. First, it is often argued that the multipillar pension system will facilitate economic
efficiency and growth, through removing labor market distortions and by providing better  incentives, increased
savings, and better allocation of resources (James 1999).  For example, a high payroll tax could cause workers
and  employers  to  shift  from the  formal to  the  informal  sector,  thereby  hurting  productivity.  Corsetti  and
Schmidt-Hebbel (1997) show that a payroll tax of 20 percent could lead to a 47  percent shift to the informal
sector and reduce the economy-wide growth rate by more than  1 percent a year. Thus, a fully funded, defined
contribution  pillar  would  reduce  this  distortion:  following  Chile  pension  reform,  the  share  of  informal
employment  actually dropped, unemployment  fell and wages rose between  1980 and  1990.  Evidence is not
conclusive on whether pension reform leads to a rise in national saving.  Haindl Rondonelli (1996) indicates that
Chile pension reform accounts for 6.6 of the 9.9 percentage point increase in the national saving rate, from 16.7
percent  of GDP  in  1976-80 to  26.6 percent in  1990-94. However, the fiscal  cost  of financing  the  pension
transition  initially may have canceled out the positive effect on private saving (Agosin et  al  1996, Holzmann
1996).  On the other  hand, there  is  strong evidence of the  positive  effects of a  fully  funded second  pillar
(individual accounts) on financial market development, and hence on resource allocation and growth.  (See, for
example, Holzmann 1997a, Schmidt-Hebbel 1998, Vittas and Iglesias 1992, Vittas 1995.)
Another  argument  for  the  multipillar  system  is that  it enhances the  financial  sustainability  of  the
pension system and thereby provides better long-term protection for the elderly.  Further, a multipillar system
has a redistributive impact and, in particular, could improve intergenerational equity (James 1999). In principle,
the entire  population should have access to some old age income, at a minimum to a level above the poverty
line, and all workers should have a portion of their earnings replaced, consistent with their work  history and
contribution.  The pay-as-you-go system, however, cannot ensure the protection  of the  elderly and  leads to
unintended  income transfers  from the poor to the rich (who live longer).  Overly generous benefits  in  some
countries have led to unfair intergeneration redistribution, putting a heavy burden on future generations.
How have countries reformed their pension systems?  Schwarz and  Demirguc-Kunt (1999) provide  a
typology of pension reforms around the world. According to their classification, some 82 countries have carried
out reforms,  of which 21  implemented a major  structural reform.  Among major  reformers,  10 countries are
moving toward fully funded individual accounts (the Latin America model), three OECD countries are adopting
an employer-sponsored, defined contribution system, and three countries (Latvia, Poland, and Sweden) are using
notional defined contribution systems.  Several other developing countries are moving in an opposite direction,
from defined contribution provident funds to the PAYGO defined benefit system (Figure 1).
6 These  problems  were recognized  and analyzed  by many  seminal  work  on pension  systems,  for example,  Aaron 1977,
Atkinson  1987,  Auerback  and kotlikoff  1987,  Feldstein 1974,  Feldstein  and Samwick  1992,  Seidman  1986,  Arrau 1990,
Kotilkoff 1995  and 1997,  Holzmann  1988,  James 1992  and 1994.  See World  Bank 1994  for a literature  survey. See also
Holzmann  1999  and other  studies  on Pension  Reform  Primer  at www.worldbank.org/pensions.
6Countries  adopted differing pension reform paths based on their initial conditions  and socio political
situations.  The pros and cons of various  types of reform  are discussed  in detail in Schwarz  and Demirguc-Kunt
1999  and James 1999. One of the factors  influencing  a country's  choice of reform  path was the size of implicit
pension  debt (IPD). A huge IPD forced  some countries,  such as Latvia,  Poland,  and Sweden,  to adopt a notional
defined  contribution  system  (Disney 1999). Countries  have  used various options  to finance  the transition  cost or
IPD. These  and other issues  will be discussed  later in the paper.
Figure 1. Classification of pension reforms/systems
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Pension reform in China
Past reforms. China used to have an urban- and enterprise-based PAYGO pension system  covering
only the state sector and some large collective enterprises.  After some experimentation beginning in
1982, pension  reform was  formally begun  in  1986 when  State Council Document  77  encouraged
pension pooling across state enterprises on a limited basis at the municipal level, which  individual
contribution was implemented for contractual workers only.  State Council Document  33  of  1991
called for individual contributions by all workers and encouraged experimentation including a role for
individual accounts.  It also, for the first time, called for the establishment of three tiers in the pension
system: a  basic benefit,  a  supplementary benefit  to  be  provided by enterprises  in  sound  financial
condition, and a benefit based on individual saving.
Reform of 1995
In 1995 State Council Document 6 proposed two plans for the basic pension tier.  Municipal
and prefecture governments were given the right to select a reformn  design and provincial governments
the right to approve the choice.  This led to a highly fragmented system in which provincial and local
governments and line-ministries selected various combinations of the two plans.  In collaboration with
7the State Planning Commission, a World Bank mission visited 8 Chinese cities and provinces in 1995,
and pointed out several problems with the new system, including:
*  Fragmentation caused by wide dispersion of authority over pension policy;
*  Low and variable coverage;
*  Inadequate pooling and portability;
High contribution rates, ranging from  10 percent (in civil aviation sector) to 29 or 30 percent  in
several municipalities (World Bank 1997).
The World Bank study recommended a multipillar system, which would consist of a small pay-
as-you-go component for redistribution and social insurance (pillar 1), a large mandatory fully funded
individual accounts component (pillar 2), and a supplemental voluntary pension accounts component
funded via commercial insurance (pillar 3).  Based on simulations using an actuarial model, the report
proposed  that  pillar  1 to  be  financed  by  9  percent  of  payroll  tax  with  expanded  coverage  and
provincial-level pooling, and that it provides 24 percent replacement rate, based on average provincial
wages (World Bank  1997, page 7).  The study was optimistic, however, in  its assumptions  about
expanding coverage to 50 percent of township and village enterprises and other enterprises, leading to
an  over  estimation  of  funds  accumulated in  the  first  and  second  pillars.  Moreover,  it  could  not
investigate the effects of using different taxes to finance pillar 1 and transition cost, due to a limitation
of the actuarial model.
Current  reform  and implementation
State Council Document 26 of July  1997 defined more clearly the direction of pension  reform:  a
multi-tier pension system combining social pooling with individual account was to be instituted by
2000.  Funds were to be pooled at the provincial level, with contributions from enterprises (no more
than 20 percent of  payroll) and individual workers (4 percent of a  worker's  wages,  and gradually
increasing to 8 percent).  Pillar 1 was to be financed entirely by enterprise contributions of 13 percent,
and would provide 20 percent replacement based on average wage.  Pillar 2 individual accounts would
be financed by individual contributions plus 7 percent from enterprises. This document provides the
starting point of our policy simulation. In March  1998, a new ministry, the Ministry  of Labor and
Social Security (MOLSS),  was established to oversee policy making  for pension  and  other  social
security benefits.  This has unified policymaking on pension reform with the administrative system.
Several State Council documents  and MOLSS decrees have been issued  since  1998 to  implement
provincial-level pooling, and to clarify and enforce regulation of various aspects of the pension system,
such as the collection of contributions.'
But, China still has fragmented, municipality-based PAYGO system (plus notional individual
accounts), that is publicly  managed. This hybrid  system is in the process of transition.  Based on
incomplete knowledge gained from interviews and seminars held with officials, China's current system
has the following problems:
7 For example, State Council Notice [no. 28] on Related Issues on Implementing the Provincial Pooling of Enterprise
Workers Basic Pension Insurance and Transferring Sector Pooling to Local Govemment's management (August 6, 1998);
Provisional Regulation on Collection and Payment of Social Insurance Contributions (State Council Document 259); and
MOLSS Decree no.  I to 3 (March 1999).
8*  The system is stillfragmented.  By mid-1999, only 5 (the provincial level municipalities Beijing,
Chongqing, Shanghai and Tianjin, plus Hainan province) of the 27, had achieved full pooling or
unification.  In 17 provinces small provincial adjustment funds were established using 1- 2 percent
of total contributions sent from city pools. No such adjustment funds were possible for 5 provinces
because of the lack of funds in municipal pools.  It is reported that all  11 sectoral pools (existed
until  September  1998; see  State Council Notice 28  of 1998) have been dissolved  and  are now
participating in local social pooling. It  is not  clear, however, whether the accumulated reserves
were transferred to the local pools.
*  Social pooling  is  incomplete. In  most  localities, pension  services  are  not  socialized;  that  is,
contributions and pension expenditure are not administered separately by different agencies.  An
enterprise submits a net amount to the municipal pool, which equals the total contribution minus
the total  pension  payments to  retirees of that  enterprise.  Contribution  rates vary  significantly
across provinces and cities and in some cases even across different enterprises.
*  Coverage is narrow and uneven across regions. By the end of 1998, the basic pension insurance
system covered only 78.4 percent of workers in state-owned enterprises, 16.2 percent of workers in
collective enterprises, and 5.4 percent of workers in other urban enterprises (Hang, 1999). There is
no pension scheme for the urban self-employed or individual entrepreneurs.  In some rural areas
there is a pension scheme designed and managed by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but the coverage
is small, and will be incorporated or merged under the MOLSS system.
*  Individual accounts are largely notional.  Reserves accumulated in these accounts over the past
five years have been used to pay current retirees, as the government has not made a clear decision
on how to finance the transition cost.
X  The funding problem  is acute. Many local pension pools are financially bankrupt as compliance
rates are low and  declining and  the issue of how to  finance  the transition  cost  is unresolved.
According to MOLSS statistics, state enterprises owe the government RMB 38 billion in pension
arrears. Local governments have been using the reserves in pillar 2 to  pay pensions  to  current
retirees,  leading to  notional  or empty  individual  accounts. And  where  funding  has  still  been
inadequate, local tax revenue has been used. The Ministry of Finance data indicates, in  1999, the
MOF also transferred RMB  17 billion to 25 provinces to cover pension shortfalls in localities.  The
central government is in effect bailing out local pension pools, many of which are bankrupt.  This
trend, if unchecked, will become a threat to the fiscal sustainability of the central government.
Implicit Pension Debt and Transition Issues
Implicit pension  debt (IPD) refers to the benefit promises  a pension  scheme makes to workers and
pensioners and is measured by adding the present value of benefits that have to be paid to  current
pensioners plus the present value of pension rights that current workers have already earned and would
have to be paid if the system were terminated today.  IPD usually is calculated under the termination
hypothesis  that the  unfunded  system is  to  be terminated  immediately  and that  all  pensioners  and
workers must  be  compensated for their future pensions and  accrued rights.  IPD,  a  stock concept,
represents the direct  and implicit  liabilities that a  government can predict  with  certainty and must
include in  its  fiscal plans.  Unlike a  government's  contingent liabilities  (such as bailing  out  state
banks), IPD poses no unexpected demand for fiscal expenditure.
9Transition cost arises from the financing gap (a flow concept) created when expenditures to
pensioners and future retirees must continue even though part of the contributions have been diverted
to funded individual accounts. Thus transition cost stems from the need to pay off, over some years,
the debt of the old system.  This financing gap stems from the IPD but it is not equal to the IPD, since
some  of the  expenditures  are for new  obligations that accrue  each  day, and  some of  the  current
obligations are covered by ongoing contributions.
The size of IPD depends on many economic and demographic factors such as the age structure
of covered workers and pensioners, pension system coverage, level of pension benefits, retirement age,
replacement rates, indexation mechanism, and discount rates. World Bank (1997) estimated  China's
IPD at between 46 percent and 69 percent of 1994 GDP, based on a hypothesis that the system would
be terminated in 1994.  A recent estimate puts the IPD at 94 percent of the 1998 GDP ( Dorfman and
Sin 2000).
The Chinese government, reluctant to recognize explicitly the pension debt, has been looking at
other options to reduce or finance the transition cost (see box 2).  In fact, the government has tried to
use a combination of three methods to reduce the IPD and finance the transition.  First, China has kept
a small PAYGO pillar, with  a  13 percent  of contribution and a 20 percent  replacement rate (State
Council document 26).  About  4-percentage point of the contribution was designed to finance the
transition. 8 Second, older workers were kept under the old system, which will reduce the IPD to some
extent.  Third, the government did  not cut pension benefits, but  had hoped  that expanding pension
coverage would provide some extra funding, as workers in the private sector and township and village
enterprises are younger.
It  is now  evident  that  these  methods have  not  provided sufficient  funding  to  finance  the
transition  cost.  The funding  problem is  acute: In  1998, 22 provincial pension  pools  had  deficits
amounting to  RMB4.2 billion,  and the other  10 provinces had  RMB2.7 billion  in  surplus  (Hang,
1999).9 By the end of 1998, total reserves in the basic pension system (pillars 1 and 2) amounted to
RMB58.7  billion,  which  was  distributed  unevenly.  Five  coastal  regions,  Guangdong,  Jiangsu,
Shanghai and Zhejiang accounted for RMB26.7 billion; 21 provinces had only RMB31.1 billion; and
five provinces  had  no  reserves  (Hang,  1999).  In  1999 the  situation  worsened  and  the  central
government had to step in to provide funding for pension payments in 25 provinces.  Obviously, extra
funding resources must be found to finance the transition cost.
Based on international experience, several options can be considered by Chinese policymakers:
*  Reduce IPD by downsizing the existing system and reducing benefits,
*  Use asset-debt swaps during corporatization or privatization of SOEs,
*  Use general tax revenue or issue debt.
A recent World Bank study further specified options to finance the transition costs which include (i)
financing from general revenues or dedicated Social Security taxes; (ii) financing from central and/or
s According  to World  Bank 1997,  9 percent  of payroll  tax/contribution  is sufficient  to finance  a small  PAYGO  pillar with a
benefit  level of 24  percent  of provincial  average  wage (replacement  rate). In State Council  document  26, the contribution
rate of 13  percent  is obviously  more  than enough  for a modest  20 percent  benefit. The extra 4 percentage  points  in payroll
tax was designed to finance the transition cost.
9 However, since there is no national pooling, the central government cannot use the surpluses in several provincial pools.
These surplus pools are located in the coastal region.
10local government debt issuances; (iii) using proceeds of selling SOE or other assets; and (iv) increasing
in salary-linked contribution rates (p.3,  Dorfman and Sin 2000).
In this paper, we focus on the option of using various taxes to finance the transition cost.  But it
is  still  feasible  to  use  proceeds  from  corporatization  or  privatization:  Chile  used  proceeds  from
privatization to finance its transition cost from pension reform. The Bolivia government use proceeds
from  the privatization  of its  six largest  state enterprises to  establish a  flat  minimum pension  for
everyone.  Though  the  benefit  is  low,  it  reaches  the poorest  and  most  vulnerable  group  in  the
countries-the  elderly poor who cannot save for retirement.
Policymakers worry that corporatization or privatization will cause asset stripping  from the
State.  State assets, if sold at their market prices, will not decline in value but only change composition,
from physical assets to cash or revenue.  The state can decide how to use this privatization revenue,
whether to reduce its debt or invest in other projects.  Hungary, for example, used the proceeds from
privatization to repay its foreign debt and the subsequent reduction of interest payments and upgrading
of the country's sovereign ratings have benefited the entire population (Komai 2000).  China could still
consider using some  of the  proceeds from corportization to repay  its pension  debt. This  could be
accomplished by taxing the IPO proceeds of those publicly listed companies, and using the revenue to
set up a national pension adjustment fund, which could be either centrally managed or by private fund
managers through  competitive bidding  (as in  Bolivia).  This  topic,  while extremely  interesting,  is
beyond the scope of the present paper. '
Box 2.  How to finance  IPD: International  experience
The size of IPD is affected  by factors  such as the pension system,  pension  benefit levels, retirement  age,
replacement  rates, indexatior mechanism,  and discount  rates. It depends on the age distribution  of the covered
population  and on a set of assumptions  about  economic  and population  growth,  wages growth,  vesting  rules, and
future  rules of the pension system. In OECD  countries IPD ranges from 100 percent to 200 percent of GDP
(Table 1). The IPD estimated  for Chile at the time of its reform  (1981) was between 40 and 130  percent of
GDP, depending  on the discount  rate used. In Hungary  and Uruguay,  which have high coverage,  high system
dependency  ratios,  and generous  benefits,  IPD was more  than  200 percent of GDP.
Box Table 1  Implicit pension  debt' and pension  reform
Countries  that  have  IPD  as a percentageReforming  IPD  as a percentage  Size  of new
not  reformedb  of GDP  countriesc  of GDP  public  pillard
Senegal  27  El Salvador  35  LO
Mali  26  Peru  37  LO
Burkina  Faso  15  Colombia  40  LO
Venezuela  30  Mexico  42  LO
Cameroon  44  Bolivia  48  LO
10  Readers  interested  in this topic  may  consult,  among  others, Dorfmnan,  Lorch  and Zhang  2000  "Linking  Pension  Reform
and  State  Enterprise  Reform  in China",  Alfonso  C. Revollo,  2000  on  the  Bolivian  experience..
11Congo  30  Argentina  86  MED
Brazil  187  Kazakhstan  88  LO
Turkey  72  Chile  100  LO
Albania  67  Australia'  115  MED
China-  1994  46-69  United  Kingdom'  184  MED
China-1998  94  Netherlandse  188  MED
Ukraine  141  Denmark'  189  MED
Switzerland  189  MED
United  States  113  Sweden  210  HI
Japan  162  Hungary  213  HI
Germany  157  Uruguay  214  HI
France  216  Poland  220  HI
Italy  242  Croatia  350  HI
Canada  121
Note:
a.  IPD  is the present  value of the accrued  rights  of pensioners  and  workers,  under old system.
b.  Sources:  Kane  and Palacios,  Finance  and  Development,  June 1996,  p. 38.
Robert  Palacios  for Albania,  Cheikh  Kane  for Burkina  Faso,  Congo,  Mali;
Paul Van der Noord and  Richard  Herd,  Pension  Liabilities  in the Seven  Major  Economies,  OECD  1993  for OECD
Countries.  World  Bank 1997  for China-1994;  Dorfman  and Sin  2000 for China-1998  estimates.
c.  Estimates  by James  based on current  public  expenditure.  Details  available  upon  request.
Hungary,  Peru and  Uruguay  are taken  from Kane  and Palacios,  Finance  and Development,  June 1996,  p. 38.
d.  LO: minimum  pension  guarantee,  financed  out of general  revenues  (except  Bolivia).
e.  MED:  flat (or compressed)  public  pillar and  means-testing,  usually  financed  out of general  revenues.
HI: large  eamings-related  public  pillar, financed  out of payroll  tax.
f.  Old  system  featured  universal  benefits  financed  out of general  revenues,  not out of earmarked  payroll  taxes. Hence,  the
IPD  owed as repayment  of past contributions  is less  applicable.
There are three principle ways to finance transition: cutting the size of IPD, finding special assets, and using
taxation or issuing debt.
Reduce the value of IPD:
*  Downsize the old system by reducing benefits, raising retirement age,
*  Recognize past service cautiously through a recognition bond to be cashed upon retirement.  The face value
of the bond can be reduced if workers have confidence in the new system and young workers will be better
off even without compensation for their past contributions.  Mexico gives workers the right to return to the
old system at the time of their retirement, if this would improve their welfare.
*  Make only a partial switch to the new defined contribution system.  Keep some workers in the old system,
thus reducing the financing gap.
*  Retain a PAYGO public pillar in the new system.
Find special revenue sources:
*  Use social security surplus, if there  is a pre-existing reserve in the social security system. The U.S. social
security trust fund can be used in this way.
*  Use Asset-debt swaps.  If public enterprises are being privatized, some of the proceeds can be used to pay
off the pension debt.  Bolivia, Peru and Poland, have used this strategy.  Bolivia used proceeds from the
12privatization  of its six largest state enterprises  to set up a pension fund and provide a flat pension for
everyone. The fund is managed  by two intemational  fund managers  selected  through competitive  bidding
on administrative  costs.
*  Reduce  evasion  and increase  coverage. This can only provide  a temporary  financing  source,  however.
Use general taxation and borrowing
*  Cut other public  expenditures  to build  a budget  surplus,  which can be used to cover  the financing  gap.
*  Issue  general  treasure  debt to cover  the remaining  cash gap in the short run.
*  Pay off explicit  pension  debt through  taxation.
Source:  based  on James  1999.
CGE framework and its advantages
There has been a great deal of academic interest in analyzing and evaluating pension reform policies
quantitatively.  M. Feldstein (1974) pioneered the use of mathematical tools for describing aggregate
capital accumulation in a social security system.  Thomas J. Sargent and his colleagues (1995) used a
rational expectation model to examine the impact of pension fund system. Laurence Seidman (1986),
Patricio Arrau  (1990), Laurence Kotilkoff (1997) and many others have advanced significantly the
study of pension systems in recent years.  The World Bank has developed a user-friendly computer
program to  calculate the effects  of pension  fund collection based  on  an actuarial  model  (Pension
Reform Options Simulation Toolkit, PROST). While their research has provided important theoretical
guidelines in this area, there have been repeated calls for more quantitative studies on social security to
assist in the design of reform strategies.
Many quantitative studies in the past have relied on partial equilibrium analysis. For example,
prices and wages were assumed as fixed:  changes in the pension system would have no effect on the
price level of products and input materials, no effect on the wage level of workers, no effect on the
labor supply and demand, no effect on the structure of the economy and  so on. In  addition, these
studies did not investigate the substitution effects between products and factors, nor did they consider
the subsequent intersectoral reactions.
The  Computable  General  Equilibrium  model  (CGE),  which  incorporates  the  fundamental
general  equilibrium links  among production  structure, pattern  of  demand,  and incomes  of  various
groups of households, has been widely used for economic policy analysis. Recent literature indicates a
rapidly growing interest in these models. For instance, CGE models have been used to analyze the
effects of various trade policies (J. Shoven and Whalley 1992), tax and fiscal policies (J. Piggott 1985),
energy policies (T. Kehoe, 1992), and so on.  Ayse Imrohoroglu, S. Imrohoroglu, and Duglas Joines
(1992) used the CGE model to conduct a life cycle analysis of the U.S. social security system.
Employing  the  CGE  model  to  analyze  the  impact  of  pension  reform  has  the  following
advantages: First, the CGE model offers theoretical consistency. It can be thought of an incorporating
particular specifications of production and demand functions in the well-known Arrow-Debreu general
equilibrium framework. An economy wide consistency check can be performed by means of Walras'
Law.  Second,  CGE models impose accounting consistency. A CGE model usually builds on a closed
accounting system such as a  social accounting matrix, which details all the basic identities  for the
13modeled economy.  Therefore, there can be  no  sources of supply  other than domestic  production,
inventories, or imports, and no destination of demand other than consumption, investment, inventory
accumulation, and exports.  Third,  CGE models can provide much more concrete welfare analysis
than other methods. Since any policy change has welfare consequences, properly measuring changes in
welfare is important for policy evaluation. A multisector, multihousehold apparatus is justified because
it generates  such measures.  Since CGE models  can provide  estimates of  welfare  effects  in  such
complicated situations, they have been used extensively over the past two decades to evaluate pension
reform programs.  See concluding remarks on weaknesses.
Actuarial models and CGE models are complementary to each other.  Both can be useful in
building  a bridge between economists and decisionmakers, and in providing them with a  basis for
dialogue and policy analysis. When policymakers need to look at links between pension reform and
macroeconomic variables,  CGE models  are required.  For pension  system design  issues,  actuarial
models should be used.  Clearly, in order to analyze pension reform in China, significant innovation in
the CGE model is needed and this innovation is possible because of the structural flexibility of CGE
models.
Structure of the CGE Model for Social Security Reform in China
Building on a  long tradition of multisector CGE models used  in analyzing trade and public
policies (Dahl, Devarajan  and Wijnbergen, 1986; de Melo and Tarr  1992; Beghin and others  1994;
Garbaccio 1994; Wang and Slagle 1996; Wang 1997; Wang and Zhai 1998), our model is recursive
dynamic and has the following features."  It differentiates production and employment among three
types of ownership, divides labor inputs into 22 age and gender groups, and has a built-in module on
population dynamics and labor supply. The model includes ten production sectors, eight representative
households, and is specified and solved in levels.'2
Firms' ownership structure and production
Assume that three types of firms'3 exist in each of the productive sectors: state-owned enterprise,
private and individual-owned enterprises  14, and other non-state-owned 5. Each firm produces only one
" For a survey  of the literature  on the application  of CGE  models  in public  policy, see Pereia  and Shoven  1988,  for
application in developing countries, see Robinson 1992; for application in on trade policies, see Garbaccio and Plummer
1997.
12 The model is implemented using the General Algebraic  Modeling System (GAMS; Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus,
1988). Because of space limitation, only a description of the major characteristics of the model is presented. A detailed
algebraic specification is available from the authors upon requests.
13  The Chinese economy  is a mixed  economy under transition.  The state  sector still plays  an  overwhelming role  in
production and employment, and the non-state sector is expanding rapidly, consisting of village and township enterprises,
joint  stock companies, foreign joint  venture companies, and private enterprises, as well as farm households in agriculture.
Since  1997,  the  non-state  sector  has  accounted for  74.5  percent  of  China's total  industrial  output  and  72.2  percent
employment.  However, to avoid serious disruption of the economy, the share of state sector will be reduced gradually. This
means that the multi-ownership structure of enterprises will persist for quite some time. Corresponding to this ownership
structure, China's  old pension  system covers only part of  state-owned enterprises. Thus, effective analysis  of  pension
system reform  and  altemative  scenarios  of  financing transition  cost  in  such  an  economy  will  require  a  model  that
differentiates production and employment by ownership types.
14 These include private investment companies, urban individual workers, and farm households.
14product.  Production  by  each  firm  uses  primary  factors  and  other  products  (both  domestic  and
imported) as variable inputs in a cost-minimizing way, and is characterized by a multilevel nesting of
constant elasticity  of substitution  (CES) functions.  At the  first level,  firms are  assumed to  use  a
composite of primary factors, i.e., value-added and an aggregate intermediate input according to a CES
cost  function. Technology  in  all  sectors is  assumed to  exhibit constant returns  to  scale,  implying
constant average and long-run marginal costs. At the second level, the division of other intermediate
demand is assumed to follow a Leontief specification; therefore, there is no substitution among other
intermediate inputs. At the same level, the value-added bundle is divided between land-capital and
aggregate labor bundles, which are further split into three age groups - old, middle-age  and young
labor. Agricultural land and physical capital inputs are at the third level. In the fourth and fifth nests,
each aggregate labor age group is further divided into detailed age and gender groups16. All composite
bundles  in  each  nest  are assumed  to  substitute smoothly in  a  CES  cost  function.  The  degree of
substitutability among them depends on their base year share in production costs and on the elasticity
of substitution, which is assumed to be constant. Each firm allocates its production output between
domestic  sales  and  exports  to  the  world  market  to  maximize  profits,  subject  to  imperfect
transformation between the two alternatives. Domestic sales and exports produced by different types of
firms  are  assumed  to  be  imperfect  substitutes,  a  CES  aggregation  function  with  relatively  high
substitution elasticity is used to  capture this property. In other words, buyers in both  domestic and
world markets choose a product mix among goods produced by the three types of firms within the
same sector to minimize their cost.
Agricultural  land as  a  sector-specific factor  is used  only  in  agricultural  production,  physical
capital is ownership-specific, but mobile between sectors, while labor force is not only mobile across
sectors, but also free to move among different ownership firms.
Domestic and import demand
Agents  are  assumed  to  consider  products  from  domestic  supply  and  imports  as  imperfect
substitutes  (the  Armington  assumption).  The  eight  representative  households  (low,  middle-low,
middle, middle-high, and iiigh income households in urban areas and low, middle, and high income
households  in  rural areas)  are  assumed  to  maximize  a  Stone-Geary utility  function  over  the  10
composite (Armington) goods, subject to their budget constraints, which leads to an extended linear
expenditure system of household  demand functions. Household savings are treated as a demand  for
future  consumption  goods  with  zero  subsistence  quantity  (Howe  1975).  A  household-specific,
aggregate consumer price index is specified as the price of savings. It represents the opportunity cost
of giving up current consumption in exchange for future consumption (Wang and Kinsey 1994). Other
final  demands,  including  public  spending  and  investment  demand,  are  based  on  constant  share
functions  that  fix  their  structure  in  real  terms.  The intermediate  inputs  for the  firms,  household
consumption, and other final demands constitute the total demand for the same Armington composite
of domestic products and imported goods from the rest of the world. A CES aggregation function is
specified for each composite commodity. The total demand is divided between domestically produced
15 These  include  urban  collective  firms,  rural  collective  enterprises,  joint stock  companies, and  foreign  joint venture
companies.
16 Workers aged 15 to 34 are classified as young labor, workers age 35 to 49 are classified as middle-age labor, and workers
age 50 and over are classified as old labor.
15and  imported goods according to  cost minimization. However, changes in stock  are assumed as a
demand for domestic products only.
Income  distribution and government policy instruments
Production  generates  income,  which  is  distributed  to  four  major  institutions,  namely,
enterprises (corporations), households, the government, and extra-budget public sectors.  Corporate
earnings equal a share of gross operating surplus, i.e., sum of capital remuneration across all sectors,
minus corporate income taxes. A part of net company income is allocated to households as distributed
profits based  on  fixed shares, which  are the assumed  shares of capital  ownership by  households.
Another part  of net  company income  is  allocated to  extra-budget public  sectors  as  fee. Retained
earnings, i.e., corporate savings for new investment and capital depreciation replacement, equals after-
tax company income minus the distributed profits and fee.
Household  income  consists  of  labor  earnings  and  the  returns  from  land  and  capital  the
household owns. Additionally, households receive pension benefits, transfers and subsidies from the
government, and remittances from the rest of the world. Household disposable income equals the sum
of household income from different sources less various taxes.
The government derives revenues from direct corporate and household income taxes, import
tariffs, and various types of indirect taxes.  Subsidies and export tax rebates enter as negative receipts.
There are three types of indirect taxes in the model. The value-added tax, which is the most important
part of indirect tax in China after 1994 tax reform, is treated as a tax levied on production factors; its
revenues equal total sector value-added multiplied by a tax rate.  The value-added tax is also levied on
imports while firms obtain rebates when they export. The second indirect tax, a sales tax, includes
household consumption taxes and other final demand taxes. The tax rate constitutes the  difference
between the aggregate Armington prices and prices of various final demands. The other indirect tax,
including various agricultural taxes, and business taxes on construction and services, is treated as a
production tax levied on sectoral outputs.
All tax rates are taken as parameters in the model. However, they can be endogenized to meet
government fiscal targets,  in which case those adjustment parameters associated with  each type of
taxes become endogenous. They shift in or out to achieve government budget balance. Otherwise, the
tax  schedules  are exogenous  and  the  adjustment factors remain  at  their  initial  value  of  one.  An
adjustment factor on government transfers, similar to the adjustment factors on other taxes, provides
another fiscal instrument to achieve a specified budget target.
Extra-budget  public  sectors  collect  fees  from  enterprise  and  households.  Their  income  is
allocated to consumption and saving. The spending by extra-budget public sectors  and government
constitutes public consumption, one type of the final demands.
Intra-period  equilibrium and macroeconomic closure
Equilibrium is defined as a set of prices and quantities for goods and factors such  that (a)
demand equals supply for all goods and factors;  (b) each industry earns  zero profit; and  (c)  gross
investment  equals aggregate  savings, which  is  the  sum  of  domestic  savings plus  foreign  capital
inflows.
Macro  closure  in  a  CGE  model  involves  both  macroeconomic  accounting  balances  and
assumptions about adjustment behavior when imbalance induced by external shock.
16There are three major macroeconomic balances in the model: (a) the government budget,  (b)
aggregate savings and investment, and (c) the balance of payments. In the benchmark equilibrium all
these three  accounting balances hold.  The behavioral aspect of macro closure involves choosing  a
mechanism by  which macroeconomic balances  are brought back into equilibrium when exogenous
shocks disrupt the benchmark during an experiment. Thus, a macroeconomic scenario is imposed on
the CGE model, and then the sectoral implications of the assumed macroeconomic behavior  can be
traced  out  (Devarajan, Lewis,  and  Robinson  1990). Because  such an  adjustment  is  not  based  on
intertemporal  optimizing  behavior  by  rational  agents, different  assumptions  about  the  adjustment
process may lead to different results.
Two government closure rules are implemented. Under the first rule, government savings is
fixed at its baseline value and one of the taxes, or government transfers to households, is allowed to
adjust  to  achieve the  government  fiscal target.  Under  the second  closure rule,  all  tax  levels  and
transfers are fixed, while real government savings is endogenous. This latter rule has significant impact
on the level of investment because investment is driven by savings in the model. The total value of
investment equals total  resources  allocated to the  investment sector; it  includes retained corporate
earnings, total  household savings, government savings, extra-budget savings, savings  from pension
funds and foreign capital inflows.
Given China's  small trade share in the world, a small-country assumption is used for imports,
i.e. we assume that the local  consumption of imports does not  affect  the border price  of imports.
Exports are demanded by the rest of the world according to  constant-elasticity demand curves, the
price elasticity of which are high but less than infinite (Pomfret 1997).  An exchange rate is specified
to convert world prices into domestic prices. Either this exchange rate or the balance of payment can
be fixed while the other is allowed to adjust, providing alternative closure rules.
Since the purpose of this paper is to estimate the implicit pension debt, and goverunent  options
in financing the transition cost, we keep the domestic savings and investment gap constant in all the
simulations conducted. This  is achieved by keeping the balance of payments  and real  government
spending; except pension expenditure, fixed as share of GDP. In such a way, macroeconomic rigidity
is imposed on the model. If government pension expenditure changes from the baseline because of an
increase in government pension payment, an increase in government tax earnings must be implemented
or a government deficit will occur. By a macroeconomic identity, this closure implies that a constant
sum of domestic savings and taxes in real terms is needed to finance both real investment and real
government expenditures. Thus, any changes in real gross domestic product (GDP) are induced by
changes in real absorption, i.e., household consumption plus other final demand, thus making it easy to
compare the efficiency impacts of different simulations.
Inter-period linkage and recursive dynamics
The  intra-period equilibrium  is  solved recursively  from  1995 to  2050.  Between  each  two
periods, dynamic growth in the model originates from three sources: rate and demographic structure of
labor  force  growth,  accumulation  of  physical  capital  stocks,  and  improvement  of  total  factor
productivity.
A built-in population and labor supply projection submodel generates the labor force growth
rate  and  its  demographic  structure.  It  also  takes  participation  rates  by  age  and  gender  into
consideration. A detailed description of this submodel will be given in next section.
17Capital stock in each simulation period equals last period's  capital stock plus gross investment
minus depreciation. No optimal behavior is assumed for investment and capital accumulation. All net
investments in the previous period are assumed to become new production capital in the next period.
Accumulation patterns for capital stock depend upon the depreciation rate and gross investment
rate, which is set exogenously as a percentage of GDP. However, household and corporate savings,
government surplus (deficit), and foreign capital inflow (foreign savings) are assumed to be perfect
substitutes and collectively constitute the sources of gross investment.
Household saving  decisions are endogenous in the model. It  represents future  consumption
goods  for  the  household  with  zero  subsistence  quantity  (by  assuming  intertemporal  separable
preferences, ELES demand system). Government saving (deficit) is fixed and growth is at the same
rate as real GDP.
In calibrating the baseline scenario, two economy wide, ownership-specific (one for SOEs, and
one for IPEs and NSEs) Hicks-neutral efficiency factors are determined endogenously to obtain a pre-
specified growth path of real GDP and total employment in SOEs. When alternative scenarios are
simulated, the two TFP growth rates are set exogenously, while the growth rate of real GDP and the
total employment in SOEs are solved endogenously.
Population projection and labor force dynamics
The sustainability of a pension system is closely related to the demographic structure of the
labor force, which  depends largely on the dynamics of population  growth. Correctly modeling  the
structure and trend of population and labor force growth is a necessary condition for any successful
pension reform design and analysis. Therefore, a population dynamics and labor supply submodel is an
indispensable component of the CGE model for China's pension reform.
Our population  projection  model  is  based  on  the  deterministic difference  equation  model
developed by Leslie (1945), which has been used widely in mathematical demography and population
dynamics studies. In such a model, China's  population is taken as a whole, all factors that  influence
population  growth, such as fertility and motility rate, are defined in terms of statistical means. We
assume that changes of time, birth, and death are the three major determinants of population growth.
The influence of other social and economic factors is implicitly included in those three determinants.
Economic growth is assumed to affect fertility rate and motility rate through exogenously specified
total fertility rate and life expectancy changes. We do not consider migration as a determinant because
the number of immigrants is very small compared with China's huge population.
Newborn population equals the number of women at their fertility age (age 15 to 49) multiplied
by the corresponding fertility rate. The population in each age group equals previous year's population
at the next younger age group multiplied by the corresponding motility rate. There will no people live
longer  than  100 years.  Fertility  and  motility  rates,  proportion  of  each  gender  in  the  newborn
population, and base year population demographic distribution can be obtained from population survey
data.
Labor supply at each age (15-70) for a given year equals the population in that age group for
that year multiplied by a labor participation rate, which is gender and age specific. These specified
labor forces are then aggregated into the 22 groups of labor inputs specified earlier in the cost and
labor demand functions. We assume that workers start to retire at age 40. The total new retirees in a
given year is the sum of all surviving workers age 40 and over multiplied by a retirement rate that is
gender and age-specific. The total retiree in a year is the sum of the surviving retirees from all previous
18years plus new retirees'.  Retirees are differentiated by ownership type. This enables the pension system
in the model to reflect the fact that pension coverage for workers differs among ownership types of
firms in China.
Pension  system  and transitional  cost
Pension  system in  the model  consists of three different pension  schemes that represent the
actual pension institution in current China. The three pension schemes are provided only to SOEs and
urban NSEs 7. IPEs and rural NSEs  are not covered by any pension system. The first two pension
schemes are pillar  1 and pillar 2 of the social pooling PAYGO system, respectively. Pillar 1 is called
the  basic  social  pooling  fund,  which  receives  contributions  from  enterprises  and  provides  a
replacement rate of 20 percent of final wages. The contribution rate for pillar  1 is 13  percent  of a
worker's wage. Pillar 2 is a mandatory individual account funded through a combination of employee
and employer contributions.  11 percent of a worker's wage goes toward the individual account.  Given
that the  fund in  individual accounts is managed publicly together with the pillar  1 fund, and most
individual accounts are empty, the individual accounts of pillar 2 are notional. Furthermore, because
this system has been implemented gradually and very recently, and most retirees in the near future will
not have accumulation in their individual accounts, retirees'  pension benefits under pillar 2 are not
defined based on their contributions to the individual accounts. Thus, pillar 2 is also  specified as a
defined  benefits  PAYGO  system  with  an  assumed  replacement  rate  of  40  percent 18. Pension
contribution in these two  pillars is implemented through  payroll tax. Payroll tax  for employees  is
considered a wage tax, and is levied on employees'  labor income, while payroll tax for employers is
levied on the capital income of enterprises.
The third pension  scheme is provided to retirees not  covered by the social pooling pension
system. It is assumed to be an enterprise-based PAYGO system. Pension benefits in this  scheme are
fixed at a base-year level, which is sector- and ownership-specific. The contribution to this scheme is
endogenously equal to pension expenditure and is levied on the capital income of the enterprise. All
pension benefits in the three pension schemes are indexed by an economy- wide consumer price index.
Pension  fund savings or  deficits in  pillar  1 and pillar  2 is  the difference between  pension
revenue and pension expenditure in each of the two pillars. Pension fund saving or deficit, government
saving or deficits, and the savings or deficits of extra-budget public sectors make up the aggregate
public saving  or deficit. A variable for  government transfers  to  pension  funds is  entered  into the
saving-deficit equation of pillar 2, which is fixed at zero. But it can be endogenous when the saving or
deficit of pillar 2 is set exogenous.  In such cases, government transfers to pension funds are adjustable
to achieve the balance of pension funds in notional individual accounts.
The model traces the accumulation of pension fund savings  and deficits,  which  constitutes
pension fund reserves and debts. The interest income and payments of a pension  fund reserve and
debts are assumed to be the revenue of pillar 1. An initial interest rate of 5 percent is assumed for the
base year. The change in the interest rate is determined by the change of the average return of capital.
This study uses two measures related to transition: implicit pension debt (IPD) and transition
cost.  IPD,  a  stock  concept,  is  the  present  value  of  total  implicit  pension  obligations  to  current
pensioners and current contributors if the current PAYGO system have to be stopped.  Different from
17 We assume  a constant  share  of the urban  NSE workers  in total  NSE  workers.
18 The final benefit received in individual accounts would depend on the length of work and amount of contribution to this
system and on how the money is invested. Officials in China estimated that on average the accounts would provide a
replacement rate of at least 38.5 percent of final wages.
19other studies, transition cost in this paper focuses on the transition of pillar 2 from notional to fully
funded individual accounts.  We assume that starting in 2001, current notional individual accounts will
be kept only for prereform pensioners and workers who have contributed to the notional individual
accounts (middle men), and that it will be phased out as the prereform pensioners and middle men die.
Fiscal resources will be  injected to finance deficits in the transition accounts. Using this  model the
financial flows over the next 50 years could be traced and estimates can be made of the financial
resources needed over time to pay the current pension and accrued pension rights of current workers.
The equilibrium data  set of the model at base  year is constructed around  a  Chinese social
accounting matrix for social security reform estimated for 1995. It provides a consistent framework for
organizing the relevant flow-of-value statistics for China's  economy to  satisfy the requirements of a
benchmark data set for CGE modeling, as outlined in Whalley (1985). Data on production and exports
are divided among three types of ownership.  The sources and structure of the base year data set are
described in annex 2. The key parameters used in the model, and their averages, are listed in annex 3.
Baseline Calibration and Simulation Design
Major  assumptions  in baseline  calibration
To calibrate a baseline of the model, we introduce two economy-wide, ownership-specific (one
for SOEs, and one for IPEs and NSEs) TFP variables into the model. These are solved endogenously in
calibration to match a pre specified path of real GDP growth and the decline of employment in the
state sector. The growth rate of real GDP is set to the actual growth rate during 1996-99. The growth
rate then declines linearly from  7.5 percent in 2000 to 3 percent in 2050. There were  113 million
workers in the  state sector in  1995. This  figure had  decreased to  about 95 million  by  1999. It  is
assumed to decrease further by 5 million annually from 2000 to 2020, and to remain stable afterward.
Since life  expectancy  will increase  with  rising  living  standards as  the  economy  grows,  a
gradually declining motility rates are calculated each year in the baseline according to exogenously
specified  life expectancy  estimates  from  recent  World Bank  population  projections  (World  Bank
1994). The total fertility rate for women of childbearing years is assumed to increase slightly between
2000 to 2050 because of  China's relaxation of its 'one child' policy in the coming years.
As mentioned, the individual accounts in China's  current pension system are largely notional,
and thus essentially a PAYGO system. The government is responsible for both the pension expenditure
in notional individual accounts and the contributions in the social pooling PAYGO system of pillar 1.
Thus, we combine pillar 1 and pillar 2 in our baseline calibration and assume 60 percent replacement
and  24  percent  contribution rates.  Detailed assumptions  on macroeconomic  closure,  demographic
parameters, and pension system characteristics used to calibrate the baseline are summarized in table 2.
(The major results from the baseline calibration are presented in table 6.)
20Table 2  Assumptions in baseline calibration
Category  Assumptions
Macroecono  - Real GDP is exogenous in the baseline
mic variables  - Labor force in state sector decreases to 51.7 million in 2020, is stable afterward
- Ownership-specific TFP growth rate is endogenous
- Trade balance gradually declines to 0 in 2010
- Gross investment rate declines from 39.7  percent of GDP in 1995 to 32
percent of GDP in 2050
- Ownership distribution of investment changes from state sector 54 percent,
individual and private 13 percent and other non-state sector 33 percent in 1995 to
state sector 20 percent, individual and private 20 percent and other non state sector
60 percent in 2050.
Demographic
parameters  - Life expectancy and total fertility rate increase from 70.3 year and 1.9 percent,
respectively, in 1996 to 76.9 years and 2.1 percent in 2050, based on World Bank
projections.
- Labor participation rates for people older than 45 increase 3 percentage points for
Pension  males and 5  percentage points for females between 1995 and 2050.
system
Characters  - Pension system coverage in state-owned sector gradually increases to I between
1995 and 2000; coverage in other sectors is fixed at the base year level
- Replacement rate declines to 60 percent (pillar I at 20 percent plus pillar 2 at 40
percent) in 2000, then remains constant
- Contribution rate increases to official rate (24 percent) in 2000, then remains
constant
- Ratio of worker contribution to employer contribution gradually increases to official
ratio in 2005, then remains constant
- Compliance rate is 85 percent
- Pension expenditure is financed by payroll tax and government saving/deficit
Govemment  - Govemrment  consumption, transfers and  saving (excluding saving/deficits for
fiscal closure  pension) are exogenous
- Corporate tax rate is endogenous to achieve government budget balance
- All other tax rates are fixed at base year level.
Simulation scenario design
Three  sets  of policy  simulations  and  eighteen  experiments  are  conducted.
Simulation set 1: Limited changes in current pension system. Since results in the baseline show that
the  current  pension  system  in  China  is  not  sustainable,  the  question  arises:  can  we  solve  the  probleiTi
simply  by  raising  the  retirement  age  (which  would  reduce  the  system  dependency  ratio)  and  expanding
program  coverage  (which  would  increase  the  pool  size  of  contribution  funds)  to  all  SOEs  and  urban
nonstate  sectors  without  any  fundamental  reforn  of  the  current  system?  The  first  set  of  policy
simulation  combines  of  one  scenario  of  expending  program  coverage  with  three  scenarios  of  increasing
retirement  age  (Table3).
21Table 3  Policy simulations set 1: Limited changes in current pensionsystem
Policy  Areas  Retirement age
No change  Increase  retirement  Increase  retirement  age for female
in  retirement  age for  female  workers  by five years  (I year each
age  workers  by 5 years  year between  2010 and  2015,  then
(I year  each year)  increase  retirement  age by five
PA YGO coverage  between  2010 and  years  (I year  each  year) for all
2015  workers  between  2020 and 2025
Urban  nonstate  and  non-  Scenario  1.  I  Scenario  1.2  Scenario  1.3
individual  sector  gradually
increase  to 100  percent  between
1995  and  2005
Major  assumption  change  from  TFP  growth  is exogenous  at baseline  rates,  real GDP  is endogenous;  the
baseline  corporate  tax rate is exogenous  at baseline  rates; government  saving is
_  endogenous,  all other assumption  stay the same
If results from the above simulations show that extending program pooling size and increasing
retirement age will not make the current system financially sustainable, will a fully funded individual
account help  solve the  pension  fund  crisis  in  China? Two  closely related  questions  arise when
considering this option, first, what is the cost of phasing out the notional accounts and what is the best
way of financing the transition cost from the perspective of the Chinese government? Second, is the
proposed new system financially superior to the current system? Simulation sets 2 and 3 are designed
to provide insights into these two questions, respectively.
Simulation set 2: reform current pension system and finance the transition cost
Simulation set 2 assumes that the current PAYGO system will be phased out after 2001. It will be
replaced by a new system with a smaller public pooling PAYGO account plus a fully funded individual
account. Workers and retirees who participated in the PAYGO system before 2001 will be covered
under the remained transitioning PAYGO system, while other workers and new employees will not
pay the payroll tax to the old system and will not be paid out of the remaining transitional PAYGO
system upon retirement. They will participate in a fully funded new system, such as the social security
plus 401K program in the United States. A full evaluation of such a system is beyond the scope of our
current study. The transitional PAYGO system will be financed by the payroll tax on the covered
workers and by other taxes. The coverage of the current pension system and the retirement age will
remain  constant in  this  set of  simulations. In  other words,  after establishing  a new  fully funded
individual retirement account to replace the current notional individual account, and injecting fiscal
resources from taxation and other financial means into the old pension system to finance the current
deficit and transition cost, the pension debt crisis in China may be solved gradually during a transition
period. This  set  of  simulations  also  estimates what  level  of  financing  would be  needed  for the
transition and considers which types of taxes or other financial means should be used to collect the
necessary funds. Details of the assumptions used in simulations in set 2 are summarized in table 4.
22Table 4. Policy simulation set 2: phasing out the notional individual account
Scenario  Assumption
The current  notional  individual  account  will be phased  out after  2001.  All workers
and retirees  that  participated  in PAYGO  system  (pillar I plus pillar 2) in 2000  will
be covered  by pillar 1 and  the remained  transitional  pillar  2, while new workers
will be covered  by pillar I and  participate  in a fully  funded  individual  account.
The remained  transitional  pillar  2 will be financed  by payroll  tax from the covered
workers  and other  taxes.
Scenario  2.1  The pension  deficit  after 2001  will be financed  by corporate  tax.
Scenario  2.2  The pension  deficit  after 2001  will be financed  by value-added  tax.
Scenario  2.3  The pension  deficit  after 2001  will be financed  by personal  income  tax.
Scenario  2.4  The pension  deficit  after 2001  will be financed  by final demand  tax.
Scenario  2.5  The pension  deficit  after 2001  will be financed  by combination  of different  types
of taxes. The share of burden:  value-added  tax 1/3,  corporate  tax 1/3,  and personal
consumption  tax 1/3
Scenario  2.6  The  pension  deficit  after 2001  will be financed  by a combination  of different  types
of taxes. The share of burden:  value-added  tax 1/4,  corporate  tax 1/4,  personal
consumption  tax 1/4,  and final demand  tax 1/4
Major  assumption  TFP  growth is exogenous  at baseline  rates,  and real  GDP is endogenous;  the
change  from  baseline  corporate  tax rate is exogenous  at baseline  rates  and government  saving  is
endogenous  before  2001;  government  saving/deficit  is fixed  and govemment  tax
adjusts after 2001; all other assumptions stay the same
Simulation  set 3: Examine the financial sustainability of the social pooling PAYGO system after
proposed reform
This set of simulations assumes that pillar 2 - individual accounts - is fully funded  and the
government no longer has financial responsibility for it. The government will be responsible only for
pillar  1 - the  social pooling PAYGO  system. Therefore, this  set  of simulations  will not take  into
account the payroll tax, penD;ion  funds, and pension benefits for the fully funded second pillar, which is
simply  aggregated  into  the  total  private  savings.  The  payroll  tax  for  the  first  pillar  will  be  paid  by
enterprises only. The replacement rate is 20 percent, according to State Council Document 26 (1997).
Similarly to  simulation set  1, a combination of two  scenarios of expanding program coverage  with
three scenarios of increasing retirement age will be conducted. However, they will be conducted on a
new base  - scerario  2.5 (see table  4).  In other words,  we want  to  use  this  set  of  simulations  to
investigate whether the public pension system  in China could become  financially  sustainable  after
injecting fiscal resources to finance the transition cost and to fully fund the individual account.
In addition, the government is considering a new social security Tax covering not only old age
pensions but also other benefits.  To provide a scientific basis for policymaking, we provide a set of
simulations  on  the  social  security  tax  (considering  the  old age pension  part  only).  Without  knowing
the details of the design, we assume, in scenarios 5.1 to 5.3, that the social security tax will be levied
on all enterprises and workers in the formal sector, including all SOEs, rural and urban  collective
enterprises,  and  urban  individual  and  private  enterprises.  The  tax  rate  is  12 percent  shared  by
enterprises and workers, rather than levied on enterprises alone; the tax burden is as 8 percent and 4
percent  for employee  and  workers  between  2000  and  2010,  and  6 percent  and  6 percent,  respectively,
afterward. The detailed simulation design is summarized in table 5.
23Table 5.  Summary of Policy Simulation Set 3. -The Sustainability of pillar 1 after proposed reform
Policy Area  Retirement age
No change in  Increase retirement  Increase retirement age for female
PA YGO coverage  retirement age  age for female workers  workers by five years (1 year
by 5 years (I year each  each year  between 2010 and
year) between 2010  2015, then increase retirement age
and 2015  by five years (I year each year)
for all workers between 2020 and
2025
Coverage of pillar I in urban non-state  Scenario 3.1  Scenario 3.2  Scenario 3.3
and non-individual sector gradually
increase to 100 percent from 2000-
2005
Coverage of pillar I in rural collective  Scenario 4.1  Scenario 4.2  Scenario 4.3
enterprises gradually increases to 50
percent from 2005 to 2010
Levy a social security tax,  Scenario 5.1  Scenario 5.2  Scenario 5.3
implemented gradually between 2001
and 2010, covering 100 percent of the
state sector; and gradually increase the
coverage of all collective (rural and
urban) and private (urban) enterprises
to 100 percent in 2010.
Major assumption change from  In scenarios 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.3, the rate of returns on pension investment is
scenario 2.5  assumed to be zero to reflect the fact that China does not liberalize pension
fund investment policy. All other assumptions stay the same.
Note: All the simulations for set 3 are based on scenario 2.5, in which it is assumed that notional individual accounts will be
phased out after 2001, and the transition cost is financed by value-added tax  (1/3), corporate tax (1/3), and final demand
tax (1/3).
Simulation results
Starting with assumptions consistent with State Council document 26, using a dynamic recursive CGE
model we estimate the annual balance of the pension fund under the current system for the next 50
years. We then discuss the impacts of various reforms of the pension system on the macroeconomic
variables.
Financial deficit of current pension system
Results  from  the baseline  calibration are presented  in table  6.  There provide a  general  picture  of
China's  economic and demographic trends over the next 50 years. Under the assumptions specified in
table 2, this calibrated benchmark will serve as a basis of comparison for counterfactual simulation
analysis presented later in this report. All the endogenously solved macroeconomic and demographic
variables seem to fall into reasonable range. TFP - as a residual and as an adjusting mechanism in the
model to match the prespecified real GDP growth rate and the gross investment rate, given the labor
24supply projected by the model - decline gradually from 2 percent a year in 2010 to  1.2 percent in 2050,
which seems consistent with recent estimations of TFP growth in China.
The  results  from  baseline  calibration  also  show  that  with  the  population  growing  at  a
decreasing rate, the Chinese labor force stops growing between 2015 and 2020 and declines afterward;
however, the age group 65 and over continues to grow. Thus, the old age dependency ratio will rise
steadily from 11 percent to reach 25 percent in 2030 and 36 percent in 2050 (Figure 2). The system
dependency ratio will remain as high  as 30 percent today, meaning that three workers support one
retiree, and will rise  rapidly to  68 percent  in 2030 and 79 percent  in 2050. At the beginning,  the
PAYGO system has a tiny surplus of RMB 0.6 billion in 2000. The gap between pension fund revenue
and expenditures will widen significantly. The accumulated reserve will become negative during the
next few years and decreases RMB 1027 billion by 2050 (table 6). Obviously, this annual deficit will
have to be financed by taxation or issuing debt, which threatens to fiscal stability and makes China's
future economic development uncertain.
Table 6. Baseline calibration
1995  1996- 2001-05  2006-10  2011-15  2016-20  2021-25  2026-30  2031-35  2036-40  2041-45  2046-50
2000
Exogenous specified variables
GDP  8.16  7.23  6.78  6.33  5.88  5.43  4.98  4.53  4.08  3.63  3.18
Life expectancya  70.30  70.57  71.72  72.49  73.28  74.11  74.97  75.87  76.86  76.86  76.86
Total fertility Rate'  1.900  1.900  1.948  1.994  2.04  2.084  2.127  2.145  2.135  2.135  2.135
Replacement rate ( percent)  65.8  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60  60
Calibrated results -
Macroeconomic trends
Growth rate ( percent)
Total absorption  8.97  7.61  7.01  6.47  5.97  5.48  5.01  4.55  4.09  3.64  3.19
Investment  10.37  8.27  7.40  6.62  5.92  5.27  4.69  4.15  3.65  3.16  2.69
Private consumption  8.13  7.16  6.69  6.31  5.98  5.62  5.24  4.84  4.41  3.97  3.52
Government revenue  8.46  7.21  6.35  5.82  5.44  5.10  4.72  4.33  3.92  3.51  3.07
Govemment saving  7.62  0.51  2.45  8.83  7.82  6.34  5.51  4.76  3.61  2.79  2.18
Labor force  1.14  1.29  0.75  0.22  -0.02  -0.14  0.01  -0.14  -0.39  -0.36  -0.10
Capital stock  10.10  9.58  8.67  7.84  7.09  6.40  5.77  5.19  4.65  4.15  3.68
TFP  2.21  1.50  1.78  2.01  2.07  2.05  1.87  1.80  1.75  1.56  1.24
1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Ratio to GDP ( percent)
Investment  39.7  39.7  38.9  38.2  37.4  36.6  35.9  35.1  34.3  33.5  32.8  32.0
Private consumption  47.1  48.2  49.3  50.4  51.5  52.5  53.4  54.3  55.1  55.9  56.6  57.4
Government revenue  9.8  10.0  9.9  9.7  9.5  9.3  9.2  9.1  9.0  8.9  8.9  8.8
Government saving  1.5  1.4  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0
Population and labor force
Population (Million)  1211.2  1267.7  1310.1  1360.1  1407.5  1436.9  1459.2  1478.2  1498.7  1514.8  1516.5  1507.8
15-64 year old  806.9  858.5  929.6  955.3  975.8  970.3  981.2  974.4  942.6  925.7  924.7  915.8
65 andolder  81.1  97.0  109.1  120.9  142.0  177.3  202.4  241.3  286.4  313.3  318.3  329.6
Old dependency ratio (%)  10.0  11.3  11.7  12.7  14.6  18.3  20.6  24.8  30.4  33.8  34.4  36.0
Share of old age people (65+)(%)  6.7  7.7  8.3  8.9  10.1  12.3  13.9  16.3  19.1  20.7  21.0  21.9
Laborforce(Million)  633.9  671.0  715.4  742.8  751.1  750.4  745.2  745.5  740.3  725.9  712.9  709.3
Agriculture  330.2  328.2  317.6  290.9  258.7  225.4  194.4  166.0  .147.1  129.1  112.7  98.4
State sector  113.7  103.8  90.8  77.7  64.7  51.7  51.7  51.7  51.7  51.7  51.7  51.7
251995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Pension (RMB 10 billion, in
1995 yuan)
Revenue  8.5  17.9  19.6  20.5  21.1  21.1  24.8  29.1  34.4  40.8  47.4  53.7
Expenditure  8.5  17.3  22.1  27.3  32.6  38.1  44.8  52.3  61.4  74.7  90.9  109.0
Annual balance  0.0  0.6  -2.5  -6.8  -11.5  -17.0  -20.0  -23.2  -27.1  -34.0  -43.5  -55.3
Accumulated reserve  0.0  3.3  0.6  -20.6  -63.7  -131.8  -222.0  -328.4  -451.2  -598.7  -787.1  -1027.3
Balanced contribution rate (%)  25.0  23.3  27.2  31.2  34.5  37.7  35.8  34.3  33.3  33.4  34.2  35.1
(with 85 percent compliance rate)
System dependency ratio (%)  25.6  28.3  35.6  43.7  52.9  64.0  67.3  68.7  70.5  74.2  77.4  79.2
IPD  (RMB lObillion in 1995  293.7  632.8  758.4  870.5  990.3  1111.8  1397.9  1731.4  2136.1  2616.6  3159.7  3713.9
yuan)
IPD as share ofGDP(%)  48.8  71.1  60.1  49.7  41.6  35.1  33.9  32.9  32.5  32.6  33.0  33.1
Source: Authors.
. The source for these two variables is 1994-95 World Bank 1994b.
It is thus necessary to increase payroll tax rates to maintain the financial viability of the pension
system. However, the balanced contribution rate would have to increase from 23.3 percent in 2000 to
37.7 percent  in 2020. After this  peak the contribution rate will decline but  still remain  as high  as
around 35 percent.  There is no  doubt that the high contribution rates for the pension  system will
seriously  depress  investment  and  reduce  the  economic  growth  rate.  The  results  of  the  baseline
calibration confirm that the current PAYGO system is not financially sustainable.
Based  on  a  termination  hypothesis  and baseline  assumptions,  implicit  pension  debt (IPD)
would be as high as 71 percent of annual GDP if the current system were terminated in 2000.  That is,
if  pension  coverage and benefit  do not change over  time, the  stock of IPD  will  increase  rapidly.
However, because the wage growth rate is lower than the assumed GDP growth rate, IPD as a percent
age of GDP declines even though its absolute value continues to increase and reaches a very high level
(RMB 37,139 billion in 2050).
Policy changes under current pension system
If the  current pension  system in China is not  sustainable, the question arises: Could  we  solve the
problem  by  raising  the  retirement  age  (which  would  reduce  the  system  dependency  ratio)  and
expanding program coverage (which would increase the pooling size of contribution funds) to all SOEs
and urban nonstate sectors - and without any fundamental reform of the current pension system?
Expanding pension system coverage.  In experiment 1.1, the PAYGO coverage in all state-owned
enterprises, the urban nonstate sectors and the non-individual sector gradually increase to 100 percent
between 1995 and 2005. The pension fund annual balances in the baseline and in experiments 1.1-1.3
are shown in Figure 3.  Because the base of the pension system is enlarged, the pension fund will show
a surplus in its annual balance during the first few years. The financial situation of the pension system
will improve compared  with the baseline between 2000  and 2035.  However, expanding  program
coverage worsens  the  financial  situation in  the long  run, because  of a  rapidly  aging. The  annual
balance of the pension declines and shows a deficit of as much as RMB766.2 billion by 2050 (exp 1.1).
If  the  pension  system  is  not  reformed,  it  will  become  a  huge  direct  financial  liability  for  the
government, affecting its fiscal sustainability.
26Raising retirement age.  The retirement age can be raised in a single move or gradually, in steps.  In
all the experiments we assume that the retirement age is raised one year every year for five years. First,
the retirement age of female workers is raised by five years between 2010 and2015.  In experiment 1.3,
the retirement age of both male and female worker is increased by another five years, one year at a
time, between 2020 and 2025. We find that raising the retirement age decreases system dependency
ratio and is useful reducing the pension fund annual balance deficit (see Figure 3). For example, the
deficit is reduced from RMB 38.4 billion to RMB 14.0 billion in 2015.  But the shortage of funds in
the pension system is still a serious problem, with the showing a pension fund deficit as high as RMB
536 billion in 2050.  If the retirement age of all workers is increased to 65 in 2020 (Experiment  1.3),
the pension system maintains a surplus.
The feasibility of raising the retirement age is questionable, however,  first, it took  the U.S.
social security system 12 years to increase the retirement age by just  2 years.  Second, we have not
considered whether additional labor supply can be absorbed into the economy.  In our CGE model,
each age group is assumed to have the same marginal productivity and all workers are assumed to be
fully employed.  It follows then that GDP would increase when the labor input is increased by raising
the retirement age. In reality, if the retirement age increases significantly, the marginal productivity of
some labor may decrease; moreover, a society that has significant surplus of labor may not provide
enough jobs for old-age workers. Thus, it might not be realistic to reduce the pension system deficit by
raising the retirement age dramatically.
Economywide impacts are shown in Figure 4.  An increase in the retirement  age of female
worker from 55 to 60 between 2010 and 2015 increases the total number in the labor force, and may
boost the GDP by 1 percent compared with the baseline in 2020. However, the push force on GDP will
disappear later  on  due to  changes  in the  demographic structure change  of  the society.  The  GDP
remains at the same level as the baseline after 2030 (see Figure 4). The retirement age of all workers is
increased significantly in experiment 1.3 and, by assumption, increases the GDP growth rate. The GDP
may increase by 5 percent compared with the baseline in 2050. The effects on government revenue and
private consumption are almost the same as on GDP.
The GINI coefficient increases continually if the retirement age of female worker remains at its
current level (55 years), perhaps because of intergenerational transfers. When the retirement  age of
female workers increased to  60 between 2010 and 2015, the GINI coefficient is reduced, helping to
relieve social inequality. If the retirement age of all workers is increased further, to 65 year between
2020 and 2025, social inequality is improved during the period 2020-2028, and maintains the same
level as in the baseline thereafter.
From the  above  simulation, it  is  clear that  the  current  PAYGO  system  is  not  financially
sustainable  even when the  retirement  age is  increased  and/or coverage  is  expanded  to  the urban
nonstate sector. A more fundamental reform of the current pension system is necessary.
Reform current pension system andfinance  transition cost
The  results  of  the  above  simulation  show  that  expanding  pension  coverage  and  increasing  the
retirement age are not sufficient to make the current pension system financially sustainable. We then
simulate the impact of a major reform in which the current notional individual account is phased out
beginning in 2001. The new system consists of a smaller public pooling PAYGO pillar plus a fully
27funded individual account.19 Workers and  retirees who participated in the current PAYGO  system
before  2001  are  covered  by  a  transitional  account  (notional  account);  new  workers  and  new
participants in the system are not get paid from the transitional account. The public pension  system
thus will be  narrowed to  one pillar  for all workers (with  a replacement rate of 20  percent).  But
prereform pensioners and active workers who contributed to the current system before be covered by
both pillar 1 and the transitional account (with a total replacement rate of 60 percent). 20
This  option raises  two closely related questions: First, what  is the cost  of phasing  out the
notional account and what is the best way to finance the transition cost from the perspective of the
Chinese government? Second, is the proposed new system financially superior to the current system?
We simulate a transition in which the pension deficit and the transition cost after 2001 are financed by
various taxies. The pension deficit is financed by corporate tax in experiment 2. 1, by value added tax
in experiment 2.2, by personal income tax in experiment 2.3, and by final demand tax in Experiment
2.4.
To answer the first question, we estimate the transition cost of using the notional individual
account as a transition mechanism and phasing them out gradually (table 7).  The transition  cost is
found to be reasonable, ranging from 0.5 to 0.6 percent of GDP during 2000-35 to 0.3 percent of GDP
in 2050. (See also Figure 5)
Table 7. Transition cost of using notional individual accounts as a transition mechanism and phasing
them out gradually
Transition  Cost  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025
Pension  deficit  6.6167  10.6785  14.8966  19.5064  24.4834
Ratio  to GDP (  0.5237  0.6079  0.6231  0.6125  0.5897
percent)
2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Pension deficita  29.9163  34.8267  38.2329  37.6058  33.1387
Ratio  to GDP  0.5648  0.5267  0.4732  0.3890  0.2927
(%)
a  Pension  deficit  of transitional  pillar 2 which  is to be financed  by taxes  (10 Bn yuan)
Source:  The authors.
To  explore  the  option  of  increasing  taxation  to  cover  the  cost  of  phasing  out  the  notional
individual  account,  experiment  2.1-2.6  look  at  the required  tax rate hikes  (table  8).  The  results  show
that  the additional  taxes  needed  to finance  the pension  transition  are reasonable,  while  it is impossible
to  avoid  a tax  rate increase,  the  required  increase  is quite  small,  indicating  it is feasible  to  finance  the
transition  cost  using  some  type  of  general  taxation.  The  question,  then,  which  tax  should  the
government  choose?
'9 Ideally,  the new fully funded  accounts  for new workers  should  be managed  by private  commercial  entities  such as
private  pension  funds,  insurance  companies  and commercial  banks.  But that  is beyond  the scope of this paper.  See Wang
1997.
20 It is beyond  the scope  of this  research  to discuss  whether  and how  the government  should  recognize  its implicit  pension
debt,  transform  it into explicit  debt,  and implement  the transition. Our aim  is to point  out the general  direction  policy
reforms  should  take, and show  the irnpact  of proposed  policy  options.
28Impacts of various taxes. The use of different taxes to finance the pension  system deficit will have
different impacts on the economy.  The impact on GDP growth wvill  differ depending on which tax is
used (Figure 6). In general, use of the personal income tax to finance the pension system has the least
effect on GDP growth, followed by the final demand tax, the value-added tax and the corporate income
tax, in that order, as pointed out by H. Varian (1984), society can achieve a higher utility level from a
personal income tax than from a commodity tax on producers, even if both generate the same level of
tax revenue. If the government levies a tax on product, it changes the relative prices between goods
and other inputs in the production process. It changes the slope of the producer's  budget line. If the
government taxes income while retaining the same amount of tax revenue, the budget line has the same
slope as in the original case but is shifted downward and is parallel. According to the property of
convex indifference curves, it is possible to achieve a higher level of utility if the budget line shifts in
parallel, rather than changing its slope. Personal income taxes generally are preferred to commodity
taxes because a low tax burden on enterprises improves efficiency, productivity, competitiveness, and
finally, social welfare (Xu 1998). The impacts of various forms of  taxation on investment are almost
the same as the effects on GDP.  Note that the cost of collecting personal income tax has not been
considered in the simulation.  For cultural and other social resources the cost of collecting personal
income tax is much higher than it is for corporate income tax and other taxes. Therefore, pension
reform and tax reform in China need to be considered.
It is expected that private  consumption will decrease if new taxes are collected to finance the
pension  system.  However, from dynamic simulations we  find that the negative impact on private
consumption persists for only  a short period. In the short term, the negative impact from corporate
income tax is not as great as that from other taxes. But in the long term, the results from our dynamic
simulations show that use of the personal income tax better stimulates private consumption (Figure 7).
Thus, considering the prospects for long-term economic development and private consumption, it is
better that the transition cost be financed by the personal income tax.
For the same amount of pension funds collected, personal income tax will improve income
distribution more than other taxes, since income tax is a progressive tax in the model. If the pension
deficit is financed using a final demand tax, the GINI coefficient may rise during the first  10 years.
From the point of view of reducing inequality, as measured by the GINI coefficient, use of personal
income tax is best, followed by corporate income tax, and value-added tax, and final demand tax, in
that order (Figure 8).
Single tax  or mixed tax. A common theme in many State Council documents is that three parties
should share the financial burden of the pension system: the government, enterprises, and individuals.
There are many options for distributing the financial burden among the three parties. Our simulation
shows the impact on the economy of using various mixes of taxation.  In MIX1, the pension  deficit
after 2001 is financed by a combination of three different types of taxes: one-third by value-added tax,
one-third by corporate income tax, and one-third by personal income tax. In MIX2, the pension deficit
is financed by a combination of four taxes: one-quarter by value-added tax, one-quarter by corporate
income tax, one-quarter by personal income tax, and one-quarter by final demand tax.
For GDP growth rate, financing the pension deficit using MIX2 is better than using MIX  1 or
VAT. It  seems to be  better to share the financial burden of the transition cost  among government,
enterprises, and individual households (Figure 9).  No matter which form of taxation is used to finance
the pension system, private  consumption will be reduced in the short term. With economic growth,
29however, the consumption  level will rebound, and the negative effect on private consumption will
disappear  in  10 years.  In  the  long  term,  with  a  view  to  enhancing  economic development  and
improving living standards, mixed taxation, in which the financial burden of transition is shared by the
government, enterprises, and  individuals, is better than an  approach that puts  the financial  burden
solely on the government.
After-reform sustainability and levying a social security tax
Following  the  proposed  reform  of  the pension  system,  the  government  is  not  financially
responsible for the newly established fully funded individual accounts, but does retain responsibility
for a  smaller first pillar-the  social pooling PAYGO system. Two sets of  simulations examine the
impacts of raising the retirement age and expanding pension coverage.  In experiment set 3, pillar  1
coverage in the urban nonstate and non-individual sectors increases gradually to 100 percent between
2000 and 2005. The retirement age is 55 for all female workers in experiment 3.1, and it increases
gradually to 60 between 2010 and 2015 in experiment 3.2; the retirement age for all workers increases
gradually to 65 between 2020 and 2025 in experiment 3.3.  Based on experiment 3, experiment set 4
expands coverage to rural enterprises between 2005 and 2010, gradually reaching to  50 percent. The
retirement age is 55 for all female workers in experiment 4.1, it increases gradually to  60 between
2010 and 2015 in experiment 4.2; the retirement age for all workers increases gradually to 65 between
2020 and 2025 in experiment 4.3.  The interest rate is assumed as zero in this set.
In experiment set 5, we assume that the government starts to collect a social security tax for the
old age pension.  Not knowing the design features being considered by the authorities, we assume the
following:
*  This will be a nationwide tax to replace the current contributions to pillarl,  and it will be levied on
all enterprises in the formal sector, including all rural and urban collective enterprises and urban
individual or private enterprises. This will unify the national pension system and impose a single
tax rate on all localities, alleviating fragmentation, improving funding, and allowing portability and
mobility for workers.
*  The tax rate will be  12 percent on the wage bill, to be shared equally by employers and workers,
that is, 6 percent will be paid by employers and 6 percent by workers.  We continue to assume that
transition cost will be financed by additional taxes (as in experiment set 2).
The benefit level will remain modest, at 20 percent of the average provincial wage level, since
the objective of pillar 1 is to ensure a living standard just above the poverty line.  An overly generous
pillar  1 would  increase  the  government's  burden  and  reduce the  incentive  to  save  in  individual
accounts, making a multipillar system impossible.
30Table 9. Pension fund annual balance (RMB 10 billion)
Experiment  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020
Base  0  0.61  -2.55  -6.82  -11.48  -17.01
Exp. 3.1  0  0.61  3.05  2.82  2.77  2.72
Exp. 3.2  0  0.61  3.05  2.91  3.71  4.62
Exp. 3.3  0  0.61  3.05  2.91  3.71  5.03
Exp. 4.1  0  0.50  2.54  2.77  2.66  2.81
Exp. 4.2  0  0.50  2.54  2.87  3.79  5.01
Exp. 4.3  0  0.50  2.54  2.87  3.79  5.53
Exp. 5.1  0  0.50  1.18  1.63  0.84  0.26
Exp. 5.2  0  0.50  1.18  1.77  2.43  3.61
Exp. 5.3  0  0.50  1.18  1.77  2.43  4.36
2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Base  -20.00  -23.19  -27.06  -33.96  -43.48  -55.33
Exp. 3.1  4.59  7.22  10.29  12.47  13.89  14.58
Exp. 3.2  7.20  10.38  14.58  18.41  21.06  22.64
Exp. 3.3  11.60  18.71  26.93  36.28  45.88  54.28
Exp. 4.1  4.78  7.70  10.80  12.14  12.14  10.98
Exp. 4.2  7.68  11.09  15.41  18.52  19.50  18.73
Exp. 4.3  13.31  21.34  30.09  39.39  47.85  53.53
Exp. 5.1  0.96  3.22  5.60  4.98  2.51  -1.21
Exp. 5.2  5.62  9.03  13.81  16.58  16.31  13.89
Exp. 5.3  14.06  24.96  37.40  50.93  63.51  72.36
Source: The authors.
The  results  of  our  simulations  (Table  9)  show  that  following  the  proposed  reform,  the
sustainability of the pension  system  is guaranteed. Pillar  1 remains in  surplus without raising the
retirement  age  (experiment3.1, 4.1  and  5.1),  and  the  annual  surplus  increases  when  coverage  is
expanded or the retirement age is raised.  Because the government will be responsible for only pillar 1
- a smaller social pooling PAYGO system with only 20 percent replacement - the financial burden to
the pension system will be reduced significantly.
The balanced contribution rates for simulation set 3 are listed in Table  10 together with the
balanced contribution rate from the first two sets of simulations for comparison. This shows that if the
current PAYGO system remains unchanged, the balanced contribution rate will be as high as 25 to 35
percent of payroll, even after expanding coverage or raising the retirement age.  In experiment 2.5,
after structural reform and tax-based financing of the transition cost, the balanced contribution rate for
pillar 1 remained rather low, ranging from 9 to 12.5 percent between 2005 and 2050. This implies that
with an 11 to 12 percent payroll tax, the small PAYGO pillar 1 (20 percent benefit) can be financially
balanced.  In experiment 3.1, 4.1, and 5. 1, the balanced contribution rates remained in the 10 percent to
12 percent range, largely consistent with our assumptions for the social security tax rate.
In the short or middle term (20 years), the new system will push GDP growth  up whether
coverage is expanded to rural areas or not. For example, GDP is 1.2 percent higher than the baseline in
set 3, and 0.8 percent higher in set 4, in 2020 (Figure 10). It seems better to raise the retirement age if
coverage is expanded to rural areas. If pension coverage is restricted to urban areas then the best option
is to set the retirement age for female workers at 60.  No others increases in the retirement  age are
31required. Because all points on the GDP curve in set 3 are higher than in set 4, expanding the pension
system to rural enterprises may slow down the GDP growth rate.
The proposed pension  system reform may reduce the GINI coefficient and improve income
distribution.  Increasing the retirement age of female workers will keep the GINI coefficient at a lower
level.  However, expanding the pension system to rural collective enterprises may not improve income
equality in the short run.  This may be attributable to rural-to-urban income transfer since the urban
population is aging faster than the rural population. In the long run, it does reduce  GINI (Figure 11).
Expand coverage under proposed pension  reform
We now focus on the  impact of expanding coverage of pillar  1 under  the proposed new  pension
system.  In experiment 3.1, the coverage of pillar  1 will be expanded gradually to the urban nonstate
and non-individual sector between 2000 and 2005; in experiment 4.1, pillar 1 coverage is expanded
gradually between 2005 and 2010. As financial sustainability is no longer a problem, we can focus on
the impact on the overall economy.
Simulation results show that expansion of pension coverage has a very limited impact during
the first 20 years. However, expanding pillar  1 coverage will slow down GDP growth after 20 years
(Figure  10, exp 4.1 compared with  3.1). Expanding pillar  1 coverage has no impact on investment
during the first  20 years  and reduces investment by  1 percent  by 2050.  The new pension  system
reduces private  consumption in the short term by about 0.5 percent, regardless of  whether pillar  1
coverage  is expanded.  But  if pillar  1 coverage  is expanded to rural  collective enterprises,  private
consumption is increased in the period from 2010 to 2030. The impact on private consumption is not
significant if pillar I coverage is expanded only to the urban nonstate sector.
In  experiment  set 2, we  find that  financing  the transition  cost  by MIXI  improves  income
distribution and thus is beneficial for improving social equality. However, the positive effect may be
lessened to some extent if the pillar  1 coverage has been expanded. It is clear that the GINI  curve
moves downward five years of the base year, then raises again if pillar  1 coverage has been expanded
to the nonstate and non-individual sector (Figure 11). The GINI curve raise more sharply if pillar  I
coverage has been expanding to rural collective enterprises.
Gradually increase the retirement age
One of  the proposed  reforms  is to  increase the retirement age gradually.  Setting aside questions
concerning the feasibility and political difficulty of this approach, we assume that the retirement age
can  indeed be  raised  gradually.  The  interest rate  for  the pension  fund  is  assumed  to  be  zero in
experiment 4.1-4.3 and 5.1-5.3.  This represents a more pessimistic assumption about capital market
development and investment returns for pillar 1.  Female workers are assumed to retire at 55 and male
whereas at 60 in experiment 4.1.  In experiment 4.2 the retirement age of female workers is increased
one year  every year until  it reaches 60 between 2010  and 2015.  Building on  experiment 4.2,  in
experiment 4.3,  the retirement  age of  both male  and female workers is  gradually  increased to  65
between 2020 and 2025 (one year every year).
The results  of  this  set  of simulations  show that increasing the  retirement  age significantly
improves the pension fund annual balance. The annual balance increases from RMB 26.5 billion  in
322010 to RMB 37.9 billion in 2015 if the retirement age of female workers is increased gradually from
55 to 60 during that period (Figure 12). The pension fund annual balance increases further from RMB
47.8 billion in 2020 to RMB 133.1 billion in 2025 if the retirement age for all workers is increased
gradually from 60 to 65 during that period.
Simulation results also show that increasing the retirement age will promote growth in GDP,
investment, and private consumption (Figure 13). The effect on the GINI coefficient, however, is not
significant after expanding coverage to rural areas and adjusting the retirement age gradually.  This
could be attributable to rural-to-urban income transfer in the initial years since the urban population is
aging  faster  than  the  rural  population.  This  might  worsen  income  distribution  since  the  rural
population  is  much  poorer  than  the  urban  population.  Thus  to  maintain  an  equitable  income
distribution, it may not be advisable to expand pension coverage to rural enterprises too soon.
If a new social security tax is levied, the old fragmented system will become unified across the
country, and the reformed pillar 1 will remain financially sustainable, even if the tax rate is lower than
specified in State Council Document 26 (Figure 14).  Here, raising the retirement age will improve the
funding situation further, allowing some accumulation of reserve funds in pillar 1.  Simulation results
also show that increasing the retirement age will promote growth in  GDP, investment, and private
consumption (Figure 15).
Conclusions
Ihis  paper  examines  the  impacts  of  various  design  options  for  pension  system  reform  on  the
sustainability of the system and on overall economy growth.  We are able to combine the CGE model
and population growth model into a recursive dynamic framework, which provides a new flexible tool
to simulate various pension reform plans in a general equilibrium setting. We differentiate production
and  employment  by  ownership  type  and  organize  the  demographic  data  in  a  matrix  with  four
dimensions.  We then conduct three  sets  of simulations with  18 experiments, (1)  limited changes
within the current system (no structure reform), (2) a structural reform (phasing out notional individual
account) and financing the transition cost by taxes, (3) various options after the proposed structural
reform including  levying  a  new  social  security tax.  Results  from  simulations  are  promising  and
summarized in the executive summary.
Our simulation results provide useful insights for the design of Chinese pension system reform
and  illustrate how  CGE  models  can be  valuable  tools  for  evaluating  different  pension  policies.
However, several important limitations need to be mentioned. First, few CGE models have been able
to  incorporate rational expectations into the behavior of  agents (though  there are perfect  foresight
models).  In  our recursive dynamic  model,  agents adjust their  behavior  according  to  information
received in the last period.  Thus, the existence of a  future pension benefit  will not  affect  agents'
saving behavior today. Second, the model does not specify explicitly the different behavior rules of the
various types of firms in China, but assumes that all operate to maximize profit. A third limitation is
that the model may overestimate the impact of various pension reform policies  on macroeconomic
variables because it does not include an explicitly specified financial market. Gross national savings,
including  pension  reserves,  are  assumed to  become  gross  investment,  implying  a  perfect  capital
market, which is far from the reality in China.  It is assumed that pension funds can earn interest that is
equal to the average return on capital, except that in experiment 4 and 5 interest rates are assumed as
zero.  To  our  knowledge, only  one  paper had  attempted  to  incorporate  financial  market  into  a
33multicountry CGE model (McKabin, 1999). It is our intention to do the same for this single-country
model.  Fourth, the simulation results may under- or overestimate the real effects of each tax financing
policy because the model does not take tax collection costs into account. And finally, CGE models
assume full employment.  Increases in the labor supply resulting from raising the retirement age are
assumed to be absorbed by labor demand, which is not realistic.  Because data and time constraints, we
could not  separate pension systems for civil  servants and  for workers, and could not examine the
impact of rural-urban migration.  Therefore, the simulation results must be interpreted with caution and
may be best understood as indicative rather than conclusive.
The next step in this work will be to conduct simulations regarding various designs for a social
security tax, with different coverage and tax rates. We also will consider debt financing of transition
cost. In the future, we hope to have the opportunity of examining the impact of a comprehensive plan
combining tax reform, wage reform, and pension reform in China.
34Table 8. Required increments of tax rates for experiments 2.1-2.6
2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Exp.2.1  Corporatetax  0  1.12  1.27  1.28  1.23  1.15  1.07  0.96  0-82  0.62  0.39
Exp. 2.2  Value-added tax  0  0.59  0.66  0.65  0.62  0.57  0.53  0.47  0.40  0.30  0.18
Exp. 2.3  Personal income tax  0  0.72  0.80  0.78  0.73  0.68  0.63  0.56  0.48  0.34  0.18
Exp. 2.4  Final demand tax rate  0  0.56  0.61  0.60  0.56  0.52  0.48  0.43  0.37  0.27  0.15
Exp. 2.5  Corporate tax  0  0.41  0.46  0.46  0.44  0.40  0.37  0.33  0.28  0.21  0.12
income tax  0  0.27  0.31  0.31  0.29  0.27  0.26  0.24  0.20  0.15  0.09
Value-added tax  0  0.15  0.17  0.17  0.16  0.14  0.13  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.05
Exp. 2.6  Corporate tax  0  0.30  0.34  0.34  0.32  0.30  0.28  0.25  0.21  0.15  0.09
Incometax  0  0.20  0.23  0.23  0.22  0.20  0.19  0.17  0.15  0.11  0.07
Value-added tax  0  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.04
Final demand tax rate  0  0.14  0.16  0.16  0.15  0.14  0.13  0.12  0.10  0.07  0.04
Source: The authors.
Table 10. Balanced contribution rate
1995  2000  2005  2010  2015  2020  2025  2030  2035  2040  2045  2050
Baseline  25.0  23.3  27.2  31.2  34.5  37.7  35.8  34.3  33.3  33.4  34.2  35.1
Exp 1.1  25.0  22.1  23.0  25.3  27.2  29.2  29.4  29.6  30.1  31.5  33.2  34.7
Exp 1.2  25.0  22.1  23.0  25.1  25.4  26.3  26.5  27.0  27.2  28.3  30.1  31.9
Exp 1.3  25.0  22.1  23.0  25.1  25.4  25.6  20.8  18.8  17.9  17.7  18.2  19.5
Exp. 2.5  8.3  7.8  9.1  10.4  11.5  12.5  11.9  11.4  11.1  11.1  11.4  11.7
Exp. 3.1  8.3  7.8  10.0  11.1  11.7  12.2  11.5  11.0  10.7  10.9  11.2  11.6
Exp.4.1  8.3  7.8  10.0  10.5  11.1  11.4  11.1  10.7  10.5  10.7  11.1  11.6
Exp. 5.1  8.3  7.8  10.6  10.7  11.5  11.9  11.7  11.3  11.1  11.4  11.8  12.1
Exp. 5.2  8.3  7.8  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.5  10.4  10.2  9.9  10.0  10.4  10.8
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Figure 3. Pension fund annual balances,  base line and experimentsl.1-1.3
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Figure 4.  Chanlge in GDP  in experiment  1.1-1.3
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